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The growing American  retired population  increasingly  is viewed for its economic  development
potential.  The relationship  between the elderly  and  local  taxes  may have  a critical effect  on
this potential,  however.  This paper  examines the  local tax implications  of an increasing
elderly  population  in communities prohibiting tax  referenda.  In  such  communities,  citizens
have  no direct  role in tax  decisions.  The elderly's attitudes  towards  different  local  taxes  are
examined  using telephone  survey data,  before using aggregate  data to investigate  the
relationship between  the elderly  and the  specific taxes  used in  communities.  The results
suggest  that a high proportion  of elderly do  not affect the  mix of local  taxes,  but that  an
increasing proportion  does have  an influence.
The growing American elderly  and retired popula-  subject to voter approval,  however. The impact of
tion increasingly is viewed for its economic devel-  a growing  elderly population in such areas may be
opment  potential.  Advocates  of  retirement-based  entirely different  than  when  citizens  vote  directly
economic  development  argue  that  retirees  are  an  about tax issues.
attractive base upon which to build or diversify  an  This  paper  examines  the  local  tax  implications
economy.  In-migrant  elderly  are  particularly  at-  of the  elderly  population  in Pennsylvania,  a state
tractive,  as  they are  relatively  young (between  55  which does not allow local  referenda.  It first  con-
and 65),  purchase housing,  deposit money in local  siders  attitudes towards  local  taxes in case  studies
banks, and contribute to the local economy without  of four rural Pennsylvania counties,  with attention
demanding  many  services  in  return.  In  addition,  to  the  influence  of  in-migrant  vs.  aged-in-place
they argue,  whether the retirees  are in-migrants or  status  on  those  attitudes.  The paper  then  takes  a
aging-in-place,  retirement  incomes  are  relatively  broader  focus  by  examining  whether  a  large  and
stable,  contrary to incomes  in much of the private  growing elderly  population  affects  annual tax  lev-
sector.  ies,  using secondary  data for all municipalities  in
A  growing  elderly  population  may  also  affect  Pennsylvania.  The  impacts  considered  include
the ability  of local governments  to levy taxes. If a  whether  specific  taxes  are levied,  and  the relative
growing  elderly  population  hinders  local  govern-  importance  of those taxes.
ments'  abilities  to  raise  taxes  at the  same time  it
increases  the  demand  on public  services,  the  net
fiscal impact may be negative. Earlier studies have  Impacts of the Elderly
looked  at the relationship between  the elderly  and
local  taxes,  generally  by examining  the  elderly's  Many  recent  studies  suggest  that  elderly  in-
support for local tax referenda  or bonds.  Most such  migrants  have positive  economic  impacts  on their
studies have suggested that the elderly  are not sup-  destination  rural  communities  (Haas  and  Serow,
portive of increasing taxes,  with consequent impli-  1988;  Longino  and  Crown,  1990;  Siegel  and
cations  for local  jurisdictions.  These  results  may  Leuthold,  1992; Hodge,  1991; Sastry,  1992; Wise-
not  hold  true  in  states  where  tax  levies  are  not  man,  1991;  Summers  and  Hirschl,  1985).  These
impacts  include  direct impacts  from  the  elderly's
expenditures  (Longino  and  Crown,  1990;  Sum-
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role  that  these  impacts  can  play.  During  the  contrast,  one  study  suggested  that  the  elderly  do
1980's,  retirement  counties  had  greater  real  in-  not  affect  school  bond  referenda  (Deller  and
come  and employment  growth than any other type  Walzer,  1993).
of  county  (Drabenstott  and  Welch,  1991).  Em-  The influence  of  the  elderly  in the  absence  of
ployment increases  between  1980  and  1986  were  local  tax referenda  is less  clear.  Without  a direct
more than four times greater in retirement counties  vote  on tax  decisions,  the  elderly  can  only affect
than in manufacturing counties,  which had the sec-  local decision-making  insofar as local  officials are
ond largest increases  (Glasgow,  1990).  influenced  by  citizen  opinions.  Furthermore,  the
Most of the positive benefits  of migration result  choice  of which local  taxes  to levy  and rely upon
from  the newly  (or "young")  retired.  This is dur-  also is of critical importance because it determines
ing what Litwak  and Longino  (1987)  define  as the  how the tax  burden is distributed  within the com-
first of the three  general  stages  of elderly  migra-  munity.  For example,  the elderly  may be support-
tion.  These  stages  include  amenity  migration,  ive  of more public  spending,  but only when taxes
moves to be closer to friends and  family primarily  are  generated  from  a  predominantly  non-elderly
due  to  declining  health,  and  institutionalization  tax  base.  A mix of local taxes  with  dissimilar in-
(Litwak and Longino,  1987).  Individual-level fac-  cidence  may allow the elderly  to shift the tax bur-
tors are  the strongest predictors  of migration,  but  den onto  others.
contextual  factors,  such  as  amenities,  are  impor-  The  choice  of  which  local  taxes  to  levy  also
tant  (Kallan  1993).  Older  migrants  are  more  at-  affects  the  relative  desirability  to  the  elderly  of
tracted to amenable locations than are working-age  retirement-destination  communities,  and  the  im-
migrants  (Clark and Hunter,  1992).  Capitalization  pact of in-migration on current residents.  This can
of these amenity values  into wages  (as opposed to  be a significant factor.  The Tiebout model suggests
land prices)  makes communities more attractive to  that taxpayers "vote  with their feet,"  moving to or
the  elderly  (Graves  and  Knapp,  1988).  Lower  from jurisdictions  on the basis of the level of local
costs  of  living  also  help  attract  elderly  migrants  taxes and spending.  Simply analyzing the elderly's
(Fournier,  Rasmussen  and  Serow  1988;  Rasmus-  support  for  a  single  tax  can  miss  these  potential
sen,  Fournier and  Charity,  1989;  Kallan  1993).  local  tax interactions.
Glasgow  (1990)  found evidence that  metropoli-  Pennsylvania  provides  a good  location  for  ex-
tan-to-nonmetropolitan  migrants  are  less  satisfied  amining  these  issues.  The  Commonwealth  as  a
with services  than  are long-term elderly  residents.  whole has a  higher percentage  of elderly  than any
The local governments  of destination  communities  state except Florida (Blair, 1989).  Several  counties
may  be  little  prepared  or  able  to  respond  to  the  in the state have experienced  high in-migration  of
in-migrant  elderly's  heavier  demands.  Also,  the  retirees,  and  they  are  also  among  the  most  eco-
elderly  have  a  higher  demand  for  specialized  nomically dynamic  in the state.  Local tax decisions
health  services,  potentially  increasing  the  burden  are made entirely  by local  officials  because  refer-
upon the local public sector (Fournier et al.  1988).  enda  are  prohibited.  Furthermore,  the  Common-
These  service demands  can  create  fiscal  strains  wealth's local  tax codes  provide a wide variety of
for local  governments,  reducing  the fiscal  benefit  local taxes  with dissimilar incidence  on the elderly
of  attracting  retirees.  During  the  early  1980's,  and  non-elderly.
Glasgow  (1990)  found  that retirement  destination
counties  experienced  increases  in per capita reve-
nue  effort  (the  percent  of  local  income  levied  in  Taxes  and the Elderly
taxes  and user  fees)  even  though  it  would be ex-
pected  that  growth  in local  income  would reduce  Local government  and  school  district  officials  in
revenue  effort. Biggar et al.  (1980)  found that  el-  Pennsylvania have a mosaic of taxes  they can use.
derly in-migrants  broaden the tax  base,  but  other  The choices  of which taxes  to  implement  and tax
studies  suggest  that the elderly  may  provide  little  rates  to levy  are  important decisions which  affect
support for  increasing  the  property tax to  pay  for  local governments'  and school districts'  abilities to
services  (Deller and  Walzer,  1993;  Tripple  et  al.  generate  sufficient  revenue,  determine how  effec-
1988).  Reeder  and  Glasgow  (1990)  found  that  a  tively  the  local  tax base  is  utilized,  and  control
concentration  of elderly  in a community  restrains  how the tax burden is distributed  among members
funding  of  public  education  and  highways,  and  of the community.  Local taxes  in Pennsylvania are
other researchers  also note that the elderly are less  shown in Table 1. Most of the local taxes in Penn-
likely to support public  school tax referenda  (But-  sylvania  have  state-imposed  millage  limits.  The
ton,  1992;  Button  and  Rosenbaum,  1989;  Hamil-  real property  and  earned  income  tax  are the most
ton  and  Cohen,  1974;  Piele  and  Hall,  1973).  In  important local taxes  in Pennsylvania,  although  in176  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
some  municipalities  the  other  taxes  provide  the  Table  1.  Local  Taxes  Available  to
majority  of tax revenue.  Pennsylvania  Municipalities
Decisions  about  which  taxes  and  tax  rates  to
levy  are made  solely by  the elected municipal  of-  Local taxes  in Pennsylvania  include:
ficials.  Real  property  tax  millage  rates  generally  1. Real  Property Tax:  levied  on the  value  of real  estate.
2. Occupation  Tax:  levied  on  the value  of residents'
are  adjusted  to  balance  local  budgets.  The  other  occupations,  as determined by  the county  tax assessors
taxes  generally  are levied at the state limit, leaving  office.  Assessed  values  are not based  upon  income,  so
only  real  property  tax  rates  flexible  enough  to  all members  of the  same occupation  will pay the  same
change.  Usually the major local  tax issue revolves  amount of occupation  tax even if their  income  differs
around the  setting  of the real property  tax millage  dramatically.  The  occupation tax is collected  from
residents,  without  regard  to  where  they actually  practice
rate.  Other issues generally concern whether or not  their  occupation.  Individuals who  have no  official
certain taxes  will  be levied.  occupation (such  as the retired)  do not pay the  tax.
The  incidence  of  these  taxes  on  different  age  3.  Per Capita Tax:  a flat rate  tax,  levied  on  adults who  live
groups  varies.  The earned  income  tax,  for exam-  in  the  urisdiction.  It  is sometimes known  as the
falls upon  workn  p  e b  e i.  "head,"  'poll,"  or  "residence"  tax.  All  adults pay the
ple, primarily falls upon working people because it  same  amount,  regardless  of their income  level.
exempts the elderly's  main sources  of income.  In  4.  Earned  Income Tax:  a tax on  residents'  earned  income
addition,  the  elderly  are  effectively  exempt  from  (such  as wages,  salaries,  or other reimbursements  for
certain other local  taxes because of their work and  work).  Unearned  income,  such  as interest,  dividends,
income  status.  Most retirees  do not pay the  occu-  pensions,  and social  security  are exempt  from the tax.
5.  Real  Property Transfer  Tax:  a tax  on  the sale  of real
pation and occupational  privilege  taxes,  for exam-  property.
ple,  because they  do not work.  The dissimilar  in-  6.  Mercantile  Tax:  levied  on the  gross receipts  of local
cidence of taxes in Pennsylvania means the choice  businesses.  It sometimes is known  as the business  gross
of taxes and millage rates affects the distribution of  receipts  tax,  or business privilege  tax.  The  mercantile  tax
the tax burdenacrosscmmuni  e.  ,can  be levied  on  wholesale  and retail trade,  as well  as
the tax burden  across community  members.  restaurants.
7.  Amusement  Tax:  taxes the  admissions  prices  to  places of
amusement,  entertainment,  and recreation.  Amusements
Attitudes towards Taxes  can  include  such things  as  craft shows,  bowling  alleys,
golf courses,  ski facilities,  or county fairs.
Attitudinal difference  towad  l  l  8. Occupational  Privilege:  levied  on  the privilege  of
Attitudinal  differences  towards  local  taxes  were  working in the municipality  All persons  employed  in a
examined through a telephone  survey in four rural  municipality  levying this tax  must pay,  regardless  of
Pennsylvania  counties.  Two  of  the  counties  had  whether they  are legal residents  of the  municipality.
experienced  growth  in  the number of  elderly  be-
tween  1980 and 1990,  while the number of elderly
in  the  other two  counties  had remained relatively  taxes were  assessed by positing  the following  sce-
stable.  Sampling was  stratified  into three different  nartos.
categories:  1) aged-in-place  elderly,  defined  as  "If some local  taxes  were  raised in  order to
older than 54 and  having lived in the county since  lower  other  local  taxes,  without  changing  the
before  1980;  2)  in-migrant  elderly,  defined  as  total amount raised,  would you lower,  raise,  or
older than 54 and having moved into the county in  keep the  (real property  tax; earned  income  tax;
1980  or later;  and  3)  the general  population,  de-  and  occupation  tax) the  same." 2
fined as being  between  18  and  54 years old.
The telephone survey  was conducted  during the  The question was asked for each of the three major
fall of  1992.  The final  sample  of  1,222  was  ob-  local taxes  The  majority of respondent  wanted  to
tained through 6,452 eligible telephone calls, for a  lower  the  real  property  tax,  while  keeping  the
response rate  of about  19 percent. 1 This  response  earned  icome  tax  and  occupation  tax  the  same
rate is within the range of those reported following  (see  Table  2).  Few  respondents  were  willing  to
most telephone surveys  (Frey,  1989; Kviz,  1977).  rase  any  of  the  taxes  in  exchange  for  lowering
The final sample  comprised  462 aged-in-place  el-  other taxes.
derly,  360  in-migrant  elderly,  and  400  general
population respondents.  2 Concern  can be raised about whether  or not respondents  know their
Respondents'  attitudes towards three major local  local tax  system well enough to accurately  answer  such a question.  The
questionnaire was pre-tested,  and  no confusion  was noted.  In addition,
discussion  with  the  telephone  interviewers  after  the survey  had begun
also revealed  no  problems  with  answering  the  question.  To the  extent
1 A  total of 11,734  telephone calls  were made,  but  5,282 were  non-  that confusion or ignorance of local taxes  does exist,  our concern in this
eligible;  they  were either  disconnected  telephone numbers,  businesses,  study is with determining  respondents'  attitudes,  as that influences  vot-
FAX  machines,  no one  over age  18  or over  54,  wrong  county of resi-  ing and  political  action,  and  less  with  how  accurate  those perceptions
dence,  or over  quota.  may be.Kelsey, Smith,  and Luloff  Impact of Aging Population on Tax Structures  177
Responses  differed  between  the  aged-in-place,  dummy  variable  set  to  1 if  the  respondent  was
in-migrants,  and general population  (Table 2).  The  male,  0 if female.  Whether the  respondent  owned
aged-in-place  were the most likely to want to lower  their own  home was also included  in the analysis,
the  real  property  tax.  Similar  to  the  findings  of  under the  assumption  that home  ownership  might
Deller  and  Walzer  (1993)  and  of  Tripple  et  al.  predispose  respondents  against  the  real  property
(1988),  the  elderly  generally  were  not  supportive  tax. It was measured using a dummy variable set to
of  increasing  the  real  property  tax.  The  general  1 if they  owned  their  home,  and  set  to  0  if not.
population  was  more likely than  the  other groups  Home ownership  was not correlated  strongly with
to be willing to raise the real property tax, though  the  income  variables  (correlation  was  less  than
such responses  were  relatively infrequent.  .107).
The  elderly  were  slightly  more  likely  to  favor  The first model in Table 3 presents the results of
lowering the earned  income tax,  and  less likely to  the analysis of the probability  of respondents want-
favor raising  it,  compared  with the  general  popu-  ing  to  lower  real  property  taxes.  The  dependent
lation.  For  the  occupation  tax,  the  elderly  were  variable was  1 if the  respondent  wanted to lower
both  less likely to  want to raise  and lower it than  the real  property  tax,  and  0 otherwise.  The equa-
the  general  population.  Aged-in-place  and  in-  tionchi-square was 53.89. Aged-in-place,  income,
migrant elderly  were  more likely than the  general  and education were the only statistically significant
population  to  want  to  leave  the  occupation  and  variables.  The  aged-in-place  were  more likely  to
earned income  taxes unchanged.  favor  reducing  real  property  taxes.  Households
The relationship between the personal character-  with incomes  of $30,000  or more  a year were less
istics  of  respondents  and  their  attitudes  toward  likely to want to lower property  taxes,  particularly
raising  and  lowering  taxes  were  further  analyzed  for incomes  over $40,000. An interpretation of this
by logistic regression.  The model examined was of  result  is  that  alternative  income-  or  occupation-
the  following  form:  based taxes would cost higher income respondents
more than  they would  benefit from the real  prop-
(1)  Y = f(P1 . *,  Pn)  erty tax reductions.  Respondents  with at least some
college education  were  also less likely to  want  to
where Y is a dichotomous  dependent variable,  and  lower  property  taxes.
P's  are  personal  characteristics  of  respondents.  The second model in Table  3 presents  results of
Several  studies  have  suggested  that the  influence  the  analysis of the attitude  toward  keep real  prop-
of age  on  attitudes  towards  taxes  is  insignificant  erty taxes the same.  The dependent variable was  1
when  education  level  and  income  are  considered  if the respondent  wanted to keep the real property
(Button and  Rosenbaum,  1989; Rubinfeld,  1977).  tax  the same,  and 0  otherwise.  The  equation  chi-
Educational attainment was measured by a dummy  square  was  40.27.  Income  and  education  again
variable. If a respondent had received at least some  were  statistically  significant,  in addition  to the  re-
college  education,  the  education  variable  was  1,  spondent being  male.  Having a household  income
while  if they had  no  college  experience  the  vari-  of $30,000 or more a year and having some college
able was set equal to 0.  In the survey,  total income  education  increased  the  likelihood  of respondents
was divided into five different categories;  less than  desiring  to keep  real property taxes the same.  Be-
$10,000  a  year;  between  $10,000  and  $20,000;  ing  male  was  associated  with a decreased  proba-
between  $20,000  and  $30,000;  between  $30,000  bility  of wanting  to  keep  real  property  taxes  the
and $40,000; and greater than $40,000. A series of  same.  Similar  analysis  was  conducted  on  the
orthogonal  contrasts  (Kerlinger  and  Pedhazur,  earned income tax  and the occupation  tax,  but the
1973)  was  used  (with  those  earning  less  than  models  produced  statistically insignificant  results.
$10,000  per  year  excluded)  to  include  income  in  Analysis  conducted  on  the  probability  of respon-
the logit  analyses.  dents believing  each tax should be raised also pro-
Whether  a  respondent  was  aged-in-place  was  duced  statistically  insignificant  results.
important because  it was  hypothesized  that  "long  These  two models  demonstrate  that even  when
term"  residents  may  have  different  attitudes  to-  controlling  for income  and education,  elderly sta-
wards local  taxes than in-migrant elderly. Because  tus,  in this case  aged-in-place,  also may influence
age  and  aged-in-place  status  were  highly  corre-  attitude towards taxes. Aged-in-place  elderly  were
lated,  alternative  equations  were  estimated  omit-  more  likely  to want to lower the  real property tax
ting  each  in turn.  Age  was  measured  by  the  re-  than  were other respondents.  There was no  statis-
spondents'  actual  age.  Aged-in-place  provided  a  tically  significant  difference  between  the  elderly
better fit in both models.  and  non-elderly  with  regard  to  keeping  the  real
The  sex  of the respondent  was  measured  by  a  property  tax the  same,  however.178  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table  2.  Attitudes Regarding Local Tax Burden by  Population Group
Attitude  Variables  Aged-in-Place  Elderly  In-Migrant Elderly  General  Population  Total
Real Property Tax***
lower  63.2%  51.2%  49.3%  55.2%
no  change  34.3  44.1  41.8  39.6
raise  2.5  4.6  8.8  5.2
Earned Income  Tax*
lower  36.6%  39.6%  34.6%  36.7%
no  change  48.8  51.3  46.0  48.5
raise  14.6  9.1  19.3  14.9
Occupation  Tax*
lower  37.8%  39.8%  42.1%  39.9%
no  change  54.4  54.2  45.4  50.9
raise  7.8  6.0  12.5  9.2
Chi-Square  Analysis
*p <  .05
**p <  .01
***p <  .001
Taxes Actually Levied  than tax  composition  (Ladd,  1992).  Much  of the
literature  that does  exist has  been largely  theoret-
Whether  the  elderly's  attitudes  towards  lowering  ical  (see,  for example,  Hettich  and  Winer,  1988;
the real property tax have a meaningful  impact on  and  Inman,  1989).  Little  of the  earlier  work has
local tax policy  is  important to consider.  This can  examined  the  influence  of the  elderly  on  local
be done  by  considering  the  relationship  between  taxes.  Potential  influences  could  include  whether
the elderly  and  specific  referenda  or tax  increases  the elderly  affect which  specific taxes  are actually
(see,  for example,  Deller and Walzer,  1993; Trip-  levied by local governments,  or how much the  lo-
ple et al.,  1988;  Button,  1989;  Hamilton  and  Co-  cal  governments  rely  upon  these  various  taxes.
hen,  1974).  In states which do not allow local  tax  Each supposition  will be examined  in turn.
referenda,  it  is  necessary  instead  to  look  directly
for  evidence  that  these  attitudes  are  reflected  in  Whether Specific Taxes are Levied
local tax policy.
The existing  literature  that focuses  on the  level  Table 4  shows  the relationship  between  the  per-
and composition  of local taxes  provides  only par-  centage of municipalities  which  levied each  tax in
tial direction in this effort. More  attention has been  1991,  and  changes  between  1980  and  1990 in the
paid to analysis of the demand for public services  proportion  of  elderly  in  the  municipalities'  total
Table 3.  Logit Analysis  of Factors Associated  with Wanting  to Lower  or Keep Unchanged
Real Property Taxes
Lower Real  Property Tax  Keep Real Property  Tax  Unchanged
Variable  Parameter Estimate  Standard Error  Parameter  Estimate  Standard  Error
Intercept  0.21  (0.20)  -0.48  (0.21)
Male  0.13  (0.13)  -0.29*  (0.13)
Aged-in-place  elderly  0.36**  (0.13)  -0.22  (0.13)
Income between  $10,000  & $20,000  -0.14  (0.18)  0.10  (0.19)
Income between  $20,000 & $30,000  -0.17  (0.19)  0.11  (0.19)
Income between  $30,000 & $40,000  -0.59**  (0.22)  0.51*  (0.22)
Income over $40,000  -0.65**  (0.20)  0.53**  (0.20)
Own home  0.30  (0.17)  -0.16  (0.17)
Education  -0.50***  (0.13)  0.50***  (0.13)
Equation Chi-Square  53.89  40.27
N  1116  1116
*p <  .05
**p  <  .01
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population.  For example,  if the  proportion  of  el-  nants of government spending.  The theoretical  is-
derly in a municipality  increased  from  15  percent  sue is how governments  actually choose quantities
of the total population in  1980,  to  19.5 percent  of  of public  goods.  The  issue  typically  is  examined
the  total  population  in  1990,  the  share  increase  by looking at voting behavior as the mechanism by
would be 4.5  percent. Such changes  can occur be-  which individuals make their preferences known to
cause the elderly  are migrating into the municipal-  government  officials.  The  institutional  context  is
ities;  the non-elderly  are  leaving,  thus increasing  "direct  democracy"  (citizens  vote directly  on de-
the percentage  of the aging-in-place;  or because  of  cisions)  vs.  "representative  democracy"  (where
a combination  of both.  elected  representatives  vote  on  the  decisions)
Municipalities  which  experienced  the  largest  (Boadway  and Wildasin,  1984).  The main analyt-
share  increases  in  the  percentage  of elderly  were  ical  approach  uses  median  voter  models  (Inman,
more  likely  than  municipalities  with  smaller  in-  1978; Romer and Rosenthal,  1979; Chicoine et al.,
creases  to  levy  the  earned  income  tax,  the  real  1989).  Although  Pennsylvania  has  neither  direct
property transfer tax,  the mercantile tax, the occu-  democracy nor referendum,  the models do present
pational privilege tax,  and  "all other"  taxes. Only  situations wherein possible influences  of the elder-
82 percent  of municipalities  in which  the  elderly  ly and retired population  can be  examined.
became  a smaller  share  of the population,  for ex-  In the optimal constitution decision summarized
ample,  levied the earned income tax, as opposed to  by  Boadway  and  Wildasin  (1984),  the  potential
94  percent  of the  municipalities  with  the  largest  incentive  for the  elderly  to  influence  taxing  deci-
increases in the proportion of elderly.  Apparently,  sions  is  apparent.  For  a  decision  rule  requiring
the elderly  influence  government  officials'  deci-  only majority rule, the likelihood that costly taxing
sions  to utilize  taxes  that  are less  burdensome  on  and  public spending  decisions  can be imposed on
their primary  income sources.  the elderly may be relatively high.  The "represen-
These results  provide  the  basis  for  a more  de-  tative  individual"  will  prefer  such  a voting  rule
tailed analysis  of the particular  Pennsylvania  situ-  because the costs (personal and public) of reaching
ation.  Because attitudes  toward the earned income  a decision  will be  lower than  higher levels  of re-
tax  differed,  and because  the  earned  income  tax  quired voting percentage  (Boadway and Wildasin,
generally plays an important role in the municipal-  1984).  The elderly,  however,  could  be  presumed
ities  which  levy  it,  the  influence  of  the  elderly  to view the personal  costs of majority decisions  as
population  on whether or not that tax is levied in a  more  of a concern,  and would  thus  work directly
municipality  will be investigated further.  (lobby the representatives)  to influence decisions.
This  analysis  can  be  placed  in  the  context  of  They can  afford to do this as they have the time to
more  general  models  that  examine  the  determi-  devote to  such activities.  The cost involved to  in-
Table  4.  Percent of Pennsylvania  Municipalities  Levying  Each Tax by  Absolute  Share
Increase  in the Population  Age  65 and Over (1980-1990)
Share Change  in Elderly
State
Municipal  Taxes  Average  <s0%  >0 to <2.5%  2.5%  to <5%  5%  to  <10%  >  10%
Real  Property  Tax  98%  100%  99%  98%  98%  99%
Occupation  Tax**  10%  15%  14%  9%  10%  11%
Per  Capita Tax***  69%  52%  71%  71%  71%  65%
Earned  Income Tax***  92%  82%  89%  91%  93%  94%
Real Property  Transfer Tax***  86%  74%  83%  86%  88%  89%
Mercantile  Tax***  11%  4%  8%  7%  12%  19%
Amusement Tax***  5%  7%  4%  5%  5%  5%
Occupational  Privilege  Tax***  44%  28%  29%  36%  47%  64%
All Other Taxes***  17%  7%  8%  11%  20%  31%
Data source: Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs.  1990.  "Local  Government  Financial Statistics,  1990."  Harrisburg:
Commonwealth  of Pennsylvania;  U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of the  Census.  1992.  1990  Census  of Population:
Summary  Social,  Economic,  and Housing  Characteristics:  Pennsylvania.  Washington,  D.C.
Chi-Square  analysis
*p <  .05
**p  <  .01
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fluence the decision  may be less than the cost that  shift"  variables.  The first model is estimated  as a
could be imposed  on them by  the majority.  More  logistic  regression  of the following  form:
importantly  for  the  usefulness  of  these  models,  y  = f(p  P.  L  L
such  actions  by  the  elderly  and  retired  could  be  (2)  T,  ,  *,  n  I 
considered  cases of direct democracy.
Inman  (1978)  discussed  and  tested the  median  where Y is a dichotomous dependent variable set to
income  voter model to examine  local  government  1 if the municipality  levied  the earned  income tax
fiscal  choice.  In  this model  the hypothesis  is that  and  0 if it did not.  The P's are population  charac-
governments  select  their  budgetary  and  service-  teristics of the municipality,  L's are location char-
provision  levels  "as  if"  to  maximize  the  well-  acteristics,  and  T's  are  tax  characteristics  of the
being of the median income family,  or voter.  Such  municipality.
a voter is not likely to be retired  or elderly.  Nev-  Button (1992)  found attitudes towards school  is-
ertheless,  while  generally  confirming  the  hypoth-  sues  split along  age  lines,  implying  that the pro-
esis, Inman's  results include points that are partic-  portion  of  elderly  in  the  population  may  affect
ularly  relevant to this  study.  which  perspectives  are reflected  in local tax pol-
Inman  found  that  the  median  public  service  icy.  The  percent  of  the  population  aged  65  and
quantity demanded equaled the quantity demanded  over in  1990 was  included  in the regression  as  a
by  a median  income  voter  times  a political  shift  reflection  of this potential  political  or social  influ-
term,  which depends  on the percent  of the  town's  ence exerted by the  elderly.  Similarly,  the change
residents  in  various  community  subgroups.  This  in the proportion  of the elderly  in the municipality
issue is relevant in the context of the present study,  between  1980  and  1990  was  used  to  reflect how
where  the  absolute  number  and percentage  of el-  these  influences  may be  changing.
derly is growing.  Inman maintains that if analysis  Because  Ladd (1992)  and Inman (1989)  focused
neglects the subtleties  of local  politics,  biased pa-  their  analyses  on relatively  homogeneous  munici-
rameter  estimates can result.  Introducing political  palities  (suburban  municipalities  and  large  U.S.
variables  permits  identification  of  special  cases,  cities,  respectively),  they did not consider whether
and  of  the  variables  which  are  most effective  in  the size of a municipality  can influence  taxes. This
moving  a  community  away  from  the  median  in-  is  an important concern because  larger  municipal-
come family's  preferred  service  level.  In Inman's  ities  in  more  likely  than  smaller  jurisdictions  to
study, the elderly had the biggest  "social  interest"  have  professionally  trained  managers  who  can
impact (negative) on school spending.  Knowledge  evaluate  tax alternatives.  The total municipal pop-
of the relative  importance  of these special  interest  ulation in 1990 was included  to reflect the potential
groups can be important.  influence  of  municipality  size.  Ladd  (1992)  and
The particular  models  of the  demand  for  local  Button  (1992)  also included  per capita  income  in
public  services  implied  by  the  median  voter  hy-  their analyses.  Income  is  important because  it re-
pothesis  are  presented  in  slightly  different  forms  flects  the  revenue  generating  potential  of  the
by  Inman  (1978)  and  by  Chicoine  et  al.  (1989).  earned income tax,  as well  as reflecting the social
Inman portrays  the  generalized  public  service  de-  characteristics  of the municipality.  All  these pop-
mand  as  a function  of  family income,  a family's  ulation  variables  were  measured  using  the  1980
tax share,  and demand factors  which are common  and  1990  Census  of Population.
to all residents within the town.  The  assumption  is  Location  characteristics  were  measured  by
that the last set of factors has a negligible effect on  whether the municipality  is located in a metropol-
the  demand  for public  services  (Inman,  1978,  p.  itan  or nonmetropolitan  county,  Municipalities  in
49).  The present study provides a direct test of this  metropolitan  counties  in  Pennsylvania  are  more
assumption;  that factors will differ for the elderly.  likely  to provide  a different  mix of local  services
Chicoine  et  al.  state  that the  normal model  speci-  than those  offered  by nonmetropolitan  municipal-
fication for public service demand  is a function of  ities, affecting the probability of the municipality's
median family income,  the tax share of the median  levying  the  earned  income  tax.  The  metropolitan
family  home,  and  other  relevant  tastes,  prefer-  variable  was  given a  1 if the municipality  was  lo-
ences,  and service condition variables. In their par-  cated in a metropolitan county,  and a 0 otherwise.
ticular  analysis,  they  include  three  measures  of  Tax  characteristics  of the municipality  included
taxes  and township population.  the real property tax base per capita,  reflecting the
The  particular  models  to  be  examined  in  this  potential tax revenue available via the real property
study  contain  similar  sets  of  variables,  plus  two  tax. Municipalities  with a smaller tax base per cap-
measures  of  the  elderly  population  as  "political  ita will have a more difficult time raising real prop-Kelsey, Smith,  and Luloff  Impact of Aging Population  on Tax Structures  181
erty tax revenue,  potentially  increasing  their prob-  a municipality  levying  the earned  income  tax  in-
ability  of levying the  earned income  tax.  The  tax  clude  having  a  larger  tax  base  per  capita,  being
characteristics  also included the local tax revenues  located  in  a  metropolitan  county,  and  having
per capita from each  of the local taxes  (including  greater  per  capita  tax  revenue  from the  occupa-
the per capita,  occupation,  real  property  transfer,  tional  privilege  and  other  local  taxes.  Having  a
mercantile,  occupational  privilege,  and  other  larger  population,  greater per  capita income,  and
taxes).  These  were  included to represent  the  rela-  receiving  greater per  capita  tax  revenue  from  the
tive  importance  of the  various  taxes  in each  mu-  per  capita,  occupation,  real  property  transfer,  or
nicipality.  The tax  characteristics  were  measured  mercantile  tax  were  associated  with  a  decreased
using a  state compilation  of 1991  financial reports  likelihood of a municipality  levying the earned  in-
from  all 2516  Pennsylvania  municipalities  (Penn-  come  tax.
sylvania Department of Community Affairs  1991),  With respect to the influence  of the elderly,  in-
and the  1990 Census  of Population.  creases in the proportion of elderly in a municipal-
Table 5  presents  results of the logit  analysis for  ity  were associated  with  a greater  chance  of levy-
the  likelihood  of levying  the  earned  income  tax.  ing the earned  income tax.  Simply having  a larger
The fit of the equation was  good,  with an equation  proportion of the population as elderly, in contrast,
chi-square  of  289.6.  The  results  were  consistent  was  associated  with a smaller  probability of levy-
with  the  contingency  table  analysis  in  Table  4.  ing  the  earned  income  tax.  This  implies  that the
Factors associated with the increased  likelihood of  elderly by themselves  may not be affecting wheth-
er the  earned  income  tax  is levied.  A higher per-
centage of elderly may mean the earned income tax
Table  5.  Logit Analysis  of Factors  does  not yield sufficient  revenue,  and other taxes
Associated  with  the Probability of  are necessary.  An increasing percentage of elderly,
Pennsylvania Municipalities  Levying  the  however,  may increase the  pressure to keep prop-
Earned Income  Tax  erty  taxes lower,  which leads  to a greater  need to
Parameter  (Standard  rely upon  the earned  income tax.
Parameter  (Standard
Variable  Estimate  Error)
Intercept  3.70***  (0.434)  Relative  Importance of the  Real Property Tax
Tax base  per capita  0.10***  (0.017)
Population  in  1990  -0.00006***  (0.00001)  Given the  generally  strong feelings  of the  elderly
Percent  of 1995  population
age  65  and over  -4.41*  (1.99)  against  the  property  tax  (supported  by results  in
Share  increase  in percent of  Tables  1  and  2  in  this  study),  the  next  section
population  age  65  and  examines this relationship in more detail.  The real
over  0.10***  (0.03)  property tax generally is used to balance local bud-
Township  -0.36  (0.20)
Metropolitan  county  0.89***  (0.20)  gets  in Pennsylvania because  the  other local  taxes
Income  per capita  -0.00004*  (0.00002)  typically  are levied  at the state limits,  leaving only
Real property  tax  revenue  real  property  tax rates  flexible  enough  to change.
per capita  -0.007***  (0.001)  Whether differences  in which  taxes  are levied lo-
Per capita  tax  revenue  per  05  (003)  cally actually  impact the  relative important  of the capita  - 0.05  (0.03)
Occupation  tax revenue  per  real  property  tax  is  also  important  to  consider.
capita  -0.16***  (0.06)  These differences can shift the tax burden from the
Real property  transfer tax  real property  tax  onto  other taxes  which  treat the
revenue  per capita  -0.07***  (0.01)  elderly's income  more  favorably.
Mercantile  tax  revenue  per
capita  -0.02***  (0.01)  The relationship  between the percent of total tax
Amusement tax  revenue per  revenues  coming  from the real property  tax to the
capita  -0.01  (0.02)  population,  location,  and  tax  characteristics  of
Occupational  privilege  tax  Pennsylvania municipalities  was examined using a
revenue  per capita  0.11***  (0.04)  model of the following  form:
All other  tax revenue  per
capita  0.37*  (0.18)  y  _  f(p,  Pn; L  Ln;
Equation Chi-Square  289.6  (3)  T  - )  I"  n
N  2507  T1 Tn)
*p < .05
**p  < .0  where  Y  is the percent of total tax revenues  which
***p  < .001  come  from  the  real  property  tax.  This  data came182  October 1995  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
from  the Pennsylvania  Department of Community  levying the  occupation,  occupational  privilege,  or
Affairs.  other  local  taxes  were  positively  associated  with
The P's are population characteristics  of the mu-  greater  reliance  on  the  real  property  tax,  while
nicipality,  L's are location characteristics,  and T's  levying  the  per capita  tax  and  earned  income  tax
are  tax  characteristics  of  the  municipality.  The  were  negatively  associated.  The  influence  of the
population  and  location  characteristics  in  the  re-  real property assessment per capita and  size of the
gression were  identical to those used earlier in the  municipal  population  were  statistically  insignifi-
logit analyses,  and  included the municipal popula-  cant.
tion in 1990,  the percentage of the population aged  The results also show that a larger percentage of
65  and  over in  1990,  the change  in the proportion  the elderly makes it more likely that a municipality
of  the  elderly  in  the  municipality  between  1980  will rely more heavily  upon the real  property  tax.
and  1990,  per capita income,  and whether the mu-  An  increase  in  the  proportion  of  the  elderly  be-
nicipality  is located in a metropolitan  county.  Sim-  tween  1980  and  1990,  however,  was  associated
ilar  to  the  logit  analyses,  tax  characteristics  in-  with  relying less upon  that tax.  The former result
cluded  the real  property  tax  base  per capita,  and  may  occur  because  with  a  higher  percentage  of
the other local taxes are levied in the municipality,  elderly  in a taxing district,  taxes on wage  earners
which  were  included  through  a  series  of dummy  may  not  yield  sufficient  revenue.  At  the  same
variables.  If a tax was levied in the municipality its  time,  as the numerical  influence,  and  presumably
corresponding  variable  was  set equal  to  1, other-  political  influence,  of the  elderly  increases,  they
wise  it was 0. Dummy variables were included for  may  be  taxes  less  (This  would be  an  example  of
the  occupation,  per  capita,  earned  income,  real  Inman's  (1978)  "political  shift"  effect.).
property transfer, mercantile,  amusement,  occupa-
tional  privilege,  and  "all  other"  local  tax  cate-  Summary and Conclusions
gory.
The model  was  estimated  using two-limit  tobit  The elderly  and retired are becoming  a larger pro-
analysis  because  the  dependent  variable  was  portion  of  the  population,  and  this  trend  is  ex-
bounded by 0 and 1. Table 6 presents results of the  pected to continue.  Increasingly,  this group is be-
tobit analysis.  Location  in a metropolitan  area and  ing looked at for its economic  development poten-
tial;  for  its  positive  impacts  on  local  economies.
Another  aspect  of  these  impacts  is  the  potential
Table  6.  Tobit Analysis  of Factors  effect on local taxes. Previous  research,  as well  as
Associated  with the Percent of Total Taxes  common perception,  often suggests that the elderly
Generated by  the Real Property Tax  are not supportive  of increasing  taxes.  This study
examined the  local  tax implications  of the elderly
Parameter  (Standard  through  two  approaches.  The  first  involved  sur-
Variable  Estimate  Error)  veys  of the  elderly  and  non-elderly  in  four  rural
Intercept  56.84  (2.08)  counties  with  both  increasing  and  stable  elderly
Tax base  per capita  0.03  (0.03)  populations.  The  second  approach  examined  the
Population  in 1990  -0.0001*  (0.0001)  tax  influence  of  the  elderly  population  and  its
Percent  of 1990  population  1.41***  (0.08)  changes  with  secondary  data for all municipalities
Age  65 and over  e.
Share increase  in percent of  in the  state.
population  age 65  and  The types  of taxes used  locally  make  a  differ-
over  -0.51***  (0.12)  ence  for  tax  fairness  and  who  actually  bears  the
Metropolitan  county  2.03***  (0.71)  local tax burden.  Certain local taxes in Pennsylva-
Income per capita  -0.0001  (0.0001)  nia,  such as the  earned income  tax or the occupa-
Occupation  tax  2.58*  (1.03)
Per capita  tax  - 1.54*  (1068)  tion tax,  affect the elderly  and non-elderly dissim-
Earned  income tax  -44.84***  (1.15)  ilarly.  In  the  telephone  survey,  for  example,  83
Real property  transfer  tax  0.81  (0.93)  percent of the income  of working age  people  was
Mercantile  tax  0.46  (1.15)  subject  to  the  earned  income  tax,  while  only  15
Amusement  tax  -5.12***  (1.41)  percent  of  in-migrant  elderly  and  23  percent  of
Occupational  privilege  tax  6.50***  (0.70)
All other taxes  6.52***  (0.90)  aged-in-place  elderly  income  was  subject  to  the
Log  Likelihood  -10239.45  tax.  These  differences  were  reflected  in the  atti-
N  2504  tudes  of respondents,  with  the  elderly  generally
p  < .05  being more predisposed  towards  taxes  which treat
**p  < .01  their income and property  favorably.  The attitudes
***p < .001  of  the  non-elderly  also  reflected  self  interest;Kelsey,  Smith,  and Luloff  Impact of Aging Population on Tax Structures  183
higher income  was  associated with a smaller like-  patterns of tax reliance,  with particular attention to
lihood of wanting to  lower the real property  tax.  whether  they  precede  or  follow  the  influx  of  in-
Earlier  studies  of the relationship of the  elderly  migrant elderly.  Research  also should  investigate
and local  taxes generally have relied upon analysis  more specifically how the tax burden is distributed
of referenda (Hamilton and Cohen,  1974; Piele and  between the elderly and non-elderly when the local
Hall,  1973;  Button and Rosenbaum,  1989; Button,  tax mix  can  be altered.
1992;  Deller  and  Walzer,  1993).  Such  voter
records  provide  a method of measuring  attitudinal
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